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Abstract
This note revisits the concepts of task and difficulty. The notion of cognitive task and its use for the evaluation
of intelligent systems is still replete with issues. The view of tasks as MDP in the context of reinforcement learning
has been especially useful for the formalisation of learning tasks. However, this alternate interaction does not
accommodate well for some other tasks that are usual in artificial intelligence and, most especially, in animal and
human evaluation. In particular, we want to have a more general account of episodes, rewards and responses, and,
most especially, the computational complexity of the algorithm behind an agent solving a task. This is crucial for the
determination of the difficulty of a task as the (logarithm of the) number of computational steps required to acquire
an acceptable policy for the task, which includes the exploration of policies and their verification. We introduce a
notion of asynchronous-time stochastic tasks. Based on this interpretation, we can see what task difficulty is, what
instance difficulty is (relative to a task) and also what task compositions and decompositions are.
Keywords: Task difficulty, task breadth, Levin’s search, universal psychometrics.
1 Introduction
There is an increased interest in artificial intelligence evaluation, motivated by recent breakthroughs produced
by new technologies, and also because of an urging pressing of characterising the abilities of machines, so that
we can have a better account of their implications in the job market and the potential risks. In the context of
universal psychometrics [25], defined as the evaluation of cognitive features of humans, non-human animals,
computers, hybrids and collectives thereof, the notion of ‘cognitive task’ was introduced and formalised, but
several issues still require further development, such as the associated concepts of task difficulty and task
breadth (or alternative concepts such as composition and decomposition).
In this paper, we realise that many tasks in artificial intelligence, human psychometrics and animal cog-
nition do not fit well within the formalism of (PO)MDP, especially with the concept of ‘transition function’.
With the help of some examples of cognitive tasks, we identify several features that a proper notion of cogni-
tive task should incorporate. It is important that we realise that the evaluation setting does not need to be
defined in terms of the way particular approaches solve the problem (which can still be approached through
a reinforcement learning approach using a MDP formalism). What we see is that the alternate finite-state
view of MDP based on transition functions makes it difficult to understand how some simple tasks, such
as response time, can be accounted for, and most especially, when we want to analyse the computational
complexity of the space of policies, in order to derive notions such as task difficulty.
In the case of using formalisms that rely on transition functions such as (PO)MDP (for discrete or
continuous cases), the notion of computational cost must be derived from the algorithm behind the transition
function, which may have a very high variability of computational steps depending on the moment: at idle
moments it may do just very few operations, whereas at other iterations it may require an exponential
number of operations (or even not halt). The maximum, minimum or average for all time instants show
problems (such as dependency on the time resolution for which the steps of the algorithm should remain fairly
constant, or the use of space with finite states). Also, the use of transition functions differs significantly
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in the way animals (including humans) and many agent languages in AI work, with algorithms that can
use signals and have a control of time through threads (using, e.g., “sleep” instructions where computation
stops momentarily). Of course, we are not saying that it is impossible to find modifications of MDP to
accommodate all this, but we are going to see a different formalism, based on probabilistic (Turing) machines
with a special “sleep” instruction.
The other important thing is the notion of response, score or return R for an episode. Apart from
relaxing its functional dependency with the rewards during an episode, to account with a goal-oriented task,
we consider the problem of commensurability of different tasks by using a level of tolerance, and deriving
the notion of acceptable policy from it. While this seems a cosmetic change, it paves the way to the notion
of difficulty —as difficulty does not make sense if we do not set a threshold or tolerance— and also to the
analysis of task instances.
After these instrumental accommodations, we are ready to derive the computational steps taken by an
algorithm during a task. This is crucial for the notion of difficulty. With this representation, the straightfor-
ward idea of difficulty as search effort is used, whatever the kind of search is (“intellectual”, “evolutionary”
or “cultural”, as Turing distinguished [57]). Difficulty is just the logarithm of the computational steps that
are required to find the optimal policy, including trying several possible policies and verifying them. This
is in accordance with Levin’s universal search [43, 44], the notion of information gain [17] and the interpre-
tation of the “minimal process for creating [something] from nothing” [47]. However, we have to be very
careful that when an agent interacts with the world or a task, this task can give hints and reinforce the
search process. How all this is set makes a big difference, especially for the interpretation of verification
(for instance, in Levin’s search, verification is simply the execution of the algorithm to check the output).
It is insightful to see that in some tasks, the agent can just find policies such as ‘do what I have seen’,
‘do a Monte Carlo approach’ and ‘learn from the examples’ instead of the ‘ideal’ specific policy for the
problem. These policies (or meta-policies) may require fewer computational steps during the search and may
lead to acceptable policies, even if the code for the search has to be counted in the description of the policy.
The notion of difficulty for tasks is usually applied to this generation of a policy for the task, either
by evaluation or through learning. This is very different to the computational complexity of the problem.
For instance, one thing is to learn a function that sorts a string and another thing is to analyse whether a
certain algorithm (or any algorithm whatsoever) can sort a string in a number of steps that is polynomially
related to the size of the string. Of course, we can ask about the computational complexity of learning a
sort function from examples, but in this cases we need to consider several factors such as (1) the desired sort
function in terms of accepted level of error, (2) what the minimum efficiency requirement for the policy is,
(3) how many examples are needed and (4) how much time is needed. Some of these questions have been
solved by learning theory, and settings such as PAC learning.
In addition, the notion of task instance difficulty is more controversial, as it usually assumes that it
is relative to the task (e.g., ‘30+0’ is an easy instance of the addition task) or even to the policy (e.g.,
‘sort gabcdef” is a very easy case for a particular sorting algorithm). Note that average-case complexity in
complexity theory refers to how many computational steps are employed to solve a set of instances (with a
distribution) given a particular algorithm —or for every possible conceivable algorithm. But one question
that is not usually made is: How can we say that ‘sort gabcdef’ is easier than ‘sort gdaefcb’ without setting
an algorithm or the definition of a distribution of algorithms? The key is to analyse the distribution of
policies and the resources they require. Of course, this must be done relative to the task with a large (or
infinite) number of instances. We will see that otherwise (if we just focus on one instance or a small set of
instances), this does not make sense, as we can just rely on memorising the policy with a lookup table.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 starts with an example and tries to identify the features
and requirements that a universal psychometric task should have to be a good evaluation task. Then it
introduces a formalism, as general as possible, for this. Section 3 investigates the notion of task difficulty,
and the necessary notions of effort (based on length and computational steps) and acceptability (using a
tolerance level). Section 4 discusses whether the notion of task difficulty can be inherited for instances.
Then we move to the notions of task composition and decomposition and their implications, and whether
this allows for the definition of response curves that may be used for adaptive tests. Section 5 introduces a
variant of Levin search that takes the stochasticity of tasks into account and includes a new term into Kt,
which is based on the number of repetitions that are needed to verify that a policy is ϵ-acceptable with some
given confidence 1− δ, a` la PAC (Probabilistic Approximate Correct). Section 6 closes the paper with some
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comments about the related work and a few open questions and directions.
2 Tasks, trials and responses
Cognitive evaluation is performed through instruments, known as cognitive tests, which are composed of
cognitive tasks. Consequently, we need to have a clear view of what a task is and how they can be compared.
In [25], tasks are defined as interactive processes with asynchronous time where the final response is not
necessarily a function of rewards. However, tasks are still based on transition functions and —partly because
of this— there is no clear handling of idle times to define a proper notion of computational steps. In addition,
it is unclear what happens if there is repeated testing on the same agent, and also if the agent has been gone
through a previous training stage or not. Despite some extra notational burden, in this paper we will try to
be explicit about all this.
2.1 Example
What do Talon the dolphin in Florida Keys [40] and Ana the sea lion in Valencia [1] have in common? Both
have been tested about their ability to judge relative quantity, a task that is usually referred to as “relative
numerousness”, “relative numerosity” or “relative quantity judgment”. Talon the bottlenose dolphin, for
instance, was repeatedly tested with two different quantities such as the two shown in Fig. 1, and was given
a reward if selected the lesser amount.
Figure 1: An example of a ‘relative numerousness’ task, where two boards are shown with a different number
of dots. The size of the dots should not matter for the quantity. Left: a panel with 5 dots. Right: a panel
with 3 dots.
Apart from cetaceans, many other studies about “relative numerousness” have been conducted in the
area of comparative psychology, including angelfish, bears, capuchin monkeys, squirrel monkeys, cats, chim-
panzees, coyotes, gorillas, hyenas, orangutans, pigeons, salamanders, sea lions and elephants (see, e.g.,
[1, 48, 62], to links to some of these studies).
The interesting thing about this example is, on one hand, that it has been applied to many different
kinds of animals, including humans of different ages (needless to say that the task is easy for adult humans
that are allowed to count). On the other hand, it is relatively easy to write a computer program that
solves this task perfectly, using image recognition and simple counting. This example will serve as a running
example to illustrate some issues of tasks: level of completion, stochastic character, sequentiality, training
stage, etc. Also, we will use it as a good example of whether and how difficulty can be determined formally,
independently of the population results.
Other tasks (originating from psychometrics, comparative psychology or artificial intelligence) will be used
in what follows and will be described in more detail if needed. For instance, we will use letter series or Raven’s
progressive matrices (as in IQ tests), response time, mazes, playing Pacman, English-Spanish translation,
simple imitation (action equal to most recent observation), eidetic memory , sudokus and addition. These
tasks are summarised in Table 1.
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Id Name Stoc Description Instances and Generation
µnum Relative numerous-
ness
yes Choose between left/right panels
the one with fewest number of dots
Number and size of dots uniformly cho-
sen from a range.
µRPM Raven’s progressive
matrices
yes Choose the option that better
matches the matrix
A finite set of problems, uniformly cho-
sen.
µCtest C-test yes Find the continuation of a letter se-
ries
The difficulty of the sequence is uni-
formly chosen.
µresponse Response time yes Press left/right button when and as
the signal indicates
A uniform distribution of delays from
a range. Left/right uniform too.
µmaze Maze yes Go from start to exit in a maze A random generator of solvable mazes
with variable proportion of walls.
µpacman Pacman yes Eat all dots without being eaten by
some ghosts
Ghosts move with some patterns but
stochastically.
µtrans Translation yes Translate a text from English to
Spanish
Texts taken from a large finite corpus.
µimit Simple imitation yes Repeatedly perform the action
equal to most recent observation
Observation chosen uniformly from a fi-
nite set
µguess Guess action se-
quence
yes Actions are guessed until match
(with reward), then another action
Sequence chosen uniformly from a fi-
nite set
µeidetic Eidetic memory yes Remember a sequence of numbers
that have only been shortly shown
Various exposition times and sequences
µsrote Short constant string no The agent must output the string.
Correct string is shown afterwards
Always the same text for all instances
µlrote Long constant text no The agent must output the string.
Correct string is shown afterwards
Always the same text for all instances
µsudoku Sudokus yes A 9×9 sudoku Consistent puzzles from a random gen-
erator
µadd Addition yes Addition of two natural numbers Numbers chosen uniformly from a
range.
Table 1: Some illustrative tasks that can be used to reason about some of the concepts discussed in this
paper. The column ‘Stoc’ indicates whether they are stochastic or not.
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2.2 Features of a task
Having a look at the ‘relative numerousness’ and other tasks, we need to consider several features (some of
them present in comparative psychology, psychometrics, reinforcement learning, etc.):
• Tasks can be administered in one or more trials. There is a result or response R at the end of a task
trial.
• As trials can be repeated, if the system is not reinitialised after each trial, we have a cumulative
evaluation of the task. Its evolution is measured in terms of the number of trials or attempts ν.
• Asynchronous time: many tasks in psychometrics require time to be continuous or to be actual time.
For instance, the response time task or a real-time Pacman requires the use of time. Note that there is a
long tradition of discrete time in AI, especially in reinforcement learning, although the use of continuous
time environments has also been studied in the areas of intelligent control and also in various kinds
of reinforcement learning [54]. We are just in favour of using asynchronous discrete time. The crucial
point is that actions and observations from the environment are not alternating.
• Trials have a limited time τ . Performance depends on this limited time.
• Interaction is given by discrete structures, but not bounded, i.e., we will consider algorithmic actions
and algorithmic observations. In other words, actions and observations are complex structures that
cannot be represented with a finite set of actions and observations. For instance, in the ‘relative
numerousness’ or ‘Pacman’ tasks we can assume a finite grid of points up to some given resolution, but
for an English-Chinese translation task inputs and outputs are, in principle, not bounded.
• States are algorithmic. There is no finite set of states. The Markov property is not assumed either.
Tasks are usually non-ergodic (it is the repetition of several task instances what makes learning possible).
• Tasks (and subjects) are stochastic (if they are not stochastic —or not very stochastic—, rote learning
will be frequent). Several trials for a task can give different results.
• When several instances of the same task are performed they can be averaged and their expected value
estimated. However, it is important to note that for different tasks, the aggregation of the response of
different tasks (e.g., an average) might not make sense (if the values are not commensurate). When
using different tasks, if they are to be aggregated nonetheless, the final score of a test can depend on
tolerance levels ϵ over the responses. Only if these are seen in terms of similar difficulty, the numerical
aggregation (and the notion of task composition) can become meaningful.
• Rewards are a kind of transmitting supervision during a trial. They may exist or not, and may be
linked or not to the response R. Difficulty will of course be affected by the (non-)existence of rewards.
In any case, it is important to clarify that observations can be an indirect sign of supervision too, as
we are talking about interactive tasks.
• In order to evaluate an agent, we do not need anything about the size of the algorithm behind the agent
or the computational steps it requires, just whether it makes some proper actions in due time. The size
of their algorithms and their computational steps are important for the calculation of the difficulty, as
we will see in the following section.
The relation between repeated trials and rewards deserves some further discussion. If a task has only one
trial (or the agent is reinitialised after each trial) and does not have intermediate rewards as in reinforcement
learning, then the system must be necessarily predefined and specialised for that task. This is what most AI
applications are conceived for. In animals, some tasks trigger an innate behaviour and can be measured in
these circumstances. For instance, many animals can choose the board with the highest number of peanuts
or fish without any training at all (and no intermediate rewards indicating whether it is doing right or not).
Of course, the innate behaviour takes place because the task (or a similar one) has appeared many times in
the evolutionary history of the species. However, many other tasks require some training, and this can be
done in animals and in AI systems. In animals, rewards can be given at the end of an episode or during the
episode. Similarly, in AI, rewards (or payoffs) are given at the end of an episode (e.g., in game theory) or
during the episode (e.g., in reinforcement learning, with the reward function). Even if these two approaches
exist for training, when we focus on measuring capabilities and skills, it is usual that intermediate rewards
are no longer used, as their effect is more difficult to control and understand. In fact, this is not actually a
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distinction between animal cognition evaluation and AI evaluation, but a distinction given by the purpose.
For instance, in (video)games, it is usual that there is an intermediate reward in the form of points for a
score, apart from the goals of each stage or the whole game.
From the above, it seems that for many tasks where the agent is not innate or preprogrammed for,
in order to measure abilities and not specific task performance, we need to consider tasks that are both
stochastic and with several trials. Several trials allow the system to be trained for the task, where the use
of stochastic tasks ensures that the system does something different from rote learning (note that a large
set of items chosen randomly is a stochastic task). In the case of several trials, it is important to consider
that for animals (including humans) and some AI systems, reinitialisation is not possible, so we have to take
into account that the realisation and result of previous trials have effect on subsequent trials. Only some
tasks can avoid this effect. In fact, some tasks used in IQ tests are usually designed in such a way that there
is no much interference between one exercise and the rest (in fact there is no learning or specialisation),
although this effect can never be ruled out completely. Finally, in adaptive tests, dependency between trials
is not only existent but characteristic. Actually, this dependency is exploited. The most general account of
a task would be to consider that they are adaptive (i.e., they have memory as well), and non-adaptive tasks
would be a special case. Even for a single task, we can have an adaptive test, provided we have a measure
of instance difficulty or some other feature that we can use to change the distribution of instances of a task.
We will deal with the issue of instance difficulty later on.
2.3 Asynchronous-time Stochastic Tasks
Now we are going to give a more formal account about how to define general tasks computationally, which
comply with the features in section 2.2 above. We want interactive tasks such that, in an episode, agent and
environment can exchange inputs and outputs at any time. We will first choose asynchronous time for it, as
this is needed in some tasks such as ‘response time’ and other real-time problems. Apart from its need in
these types of tasks, there are additional reasons for using asynchronous time in reinforcement learning [54],
and artificial life [8, 12]. Even in cases where the task is alternating (e.g., a chess match), it is important to
consider the time for each turn and the thinking time (one can think while the opponent is thinking, and
both thinking times have to be considered).
Synchronous (or more precisely, alternating discrete time) interactive machines are based on a transition
function, which is applied at each time point to change the state. The most common example is (PO)MDP.
The transition function takes a state, and observation and a reward and produces an action. It goes from
state to state indefinitely (even if it remains in the same state forever, there is some computation to apply
at each time moment, the transition function). Transition functions can have access to the environments’s
memory. In this case, if the memory is not bounded we have an infinite number of states (no longer an
MDP). In any case, even with a finite number of states because of the stochastic character there might be
a different number of computational steps taken for each transition (there might even be some transitions
that do not halt).
Asynchronous environments are not continuous-time POMDPs, which are based on transition functions
and are handled with differential equations. In fact, synchronous environments are a special case of asyn-
chronous environments where the environment waits for the agent’s action to issue observations and rewards.
Intermediate rewards during the episode are also considered but, unlike synchronous environments, the cor-
respondence of the total result as a discounted sum of rewards is not possible in general. In fact, the number
of rewards per unit of time is not limited, so the final function that maps rewards to a result may be very
varied (and it is part of the definition of the task). This is similar to the way rewards were defined in [25],
an internal thing given to the agent, whereas the score or response for the episode was an external thing not
necessarily given to the agent.
Let us now give the definition of asynchronous-time interactive systems. In an asynchronous-time inter-
active system, there is a common time (which can be discrete or continuous, and can be virtual or real).
Time will be shared by all systems that interact. An interactive system is a machine with a program code,
a finite internal discrete memory, one or more finite read-only discrete input (tape) and one or more finite
write-only discrete outputs (tape). Agents and environments use the above definition and are asynchronous-
time interactive systems. The inputs of agents are called observations and the outputs are called actions. As
special features, these machines have access to a read-only time measurement and a source of randomness
6
(either by an additional random instruction or a random tape). The programs for tasks and agents are con-
structed with a set of instructions that, if memory were infinite, would make the machine Turing-complete,
and ultimately equivalent to a Turing machine, denoted by its program over a reference universal prefix
Turing machine U . This makes this definition very close to probabilistic Turing machines1 —which are not
exactly the same as non-deterministic Turing machines. In a probabilisitic Turing machine, only one course
of action is taken, and no parallel computation is performed to keep all the alternative courses of actions.
In fact, computable stochastic processes are usually associated to probabilistic Turing machines, and not to
non-deterministic Turing machines.
We have already said that the machine will have access to a random source (through an instruction or
an extra random tape). Some animals (e.g., flies, preys) behave in a random way to avoid being predated,
and this behaviour does not require a very complex mechanism, just a few neurons being triggered on some
environmental magnitudes acting as random number generators. There is also access to time, which can be
physical time, an approximation or a virtual time. But most importantly, for the purpose of the analysis
of computational steps, we consider that the machine will be able to stop momentarily, until a given time,
through an instruction or special state sleep(t), which sets the machine to sleep until time t. During the time
the machine is sleeping, no operation is performed.
Some tasks will also have intermediate rewards. Rewards are just given through another extra tape, and
are interpreted as a natural number. Rewards are optional. In case they exist, the result of an episode may
depend on the rewards or not. This is important, as the general use of rewards in reinforcement learning,
especially with discounted reward or through averaging gives the impression that the final result or response
of an episode must always be an aggregation. For instance, in a maze, an agent may go directly to the exit
and may require no reward. On the contrary, a more sluggish agent may require more positive indications
and even with them cannot find the exit. Rewards can be just given to help in the finding of the solution,
which does not mean that the higher the rewards the higher the results. Finally, the agent is able to see the
result or score of an episode (a rational number) at the end through another special tape. A final reward
can be given instead of or jointly with the result.
While this is certainly more complex than other models of interactive machines, it accommodates the
intuitive notion of task in many natural and artificial scenarios.
2.4 Trials and results
We consider tests that are composed of tasks (also called environments), usually denoted by µ, and are
performed by agents (also called policies or subjects), usually denoted by π.
The expected value of the response, return or result of π in µ for a time limit τ is denoted by R[τ ](π, µ).
The value of τ will be usually omitted as it is understood that it is part of the description of the task µ. The
R function always gives values between 0 and 1 and we assume it is always defined. If the agent goes into a
non-halting loop and stops reacting, this is not perceivable externally and may even lead to some non-zero
R (from the previous actions or because of the type of task).
Now we need to extend the notation of R(π, µ) to consider several instances of the same task. Each
attempt of a subject on one of the task instances is a trial or episode. R[7→ν](π, µ) returns the expected
response of µ per trial with ν consecutive episodes or trials by the same agent π without reinitialisation2.
So actually it is not the same π each time, if the agent has memory. ν refers to the evaluation trials, which
are used for the expected response (which is an average of all the evaluation trials and not a sum). Note
that the expected response is given because π is non-deterministic and may lead to different situations from
the very beginning. The distribution of what each instance of a trial will look like is inside the stochastic
task. According to the task, the same instance can appear more than once, as in a sample with replacement.
As the task can have memory, we can also have some tasks that are really working as if a no-replacement
sampling were taking place. In order to do that, the task itself must keep track of the instances that have
1Probabilistic Turing machines with finite tapes (except the random tape) are like “probabilistic linear bounded automata”.
This is exactly the type of computers we are used to and the ones we are able to build with the current paradigm. Note that
this is different to subrecursive programming systems and other models of computation where it can be determined whether
programs terminate, i.e., and even what they will compute.
2Note that, if the test is not adaptive, instances have no memory, as they start from scratch. This ‘stochastic repeatability’
is related to some other conditions (e.g., ergodicity) that are sometimes imposed or assumed on tasks where a pattern or some
properties can endure indefinitely.
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appeared or must use some kind of randomised enumeration. Also, tasks can be adaptive. In other words,
instead of talking about sampling with or without replacement, it is the definition of the task that defines
this.
No waiting time or stop is considered between trials. If a task requires some resting time between trials,
then this has to be included in the very trial and not in between trials.
With R[ 7→1](π, µ), or simply R(π, µ) we denote that there is only one episode or trial (no repetitions).
For instance, many tests are of this kind if items are completely unrelated, so each item has no influence
on the following ones, although it is more applicable when we consider that the agent has no memory (or
is reinitialised between trials). In general, especially if the items are related, for every ν > 1, we have that
R[ 7→ν](π, µ) ̸= R[ 7→1](π, µ) unless the agent has no memory between episodes.
Tasks with high values of τ will imply that episodes are long, while high values of ν mean that we make
many repetitions. Note that some abilities are related to good results after very few repetitions (i.e., to
understand a concept fast). This speed is understood in many ways, but one is clearly how many ‘examples’
or ‘instances’ are needed. Note that many machine learning techniques require many examples (e.g., deep
learning [3]), many repetitions (e.g., Q-learning [63]) or large τ (e.g., AIXI [60]). In the previous example
about the ‘relative numerousness’, τ is not very relevant as the task displays the boards (or panels or dishes)
for a few seconds (τ may be 5 physical seconds). However, ν is important, and we usually require a number
of training trials (so that the animal can learn the task) and then a series of test trials.
Note that if the task has no memory, this does not allow for an evolving distribution (e.g., a kind of task
first and then switch to other tasks, or some kind of cumulative or adaptive tasks). Tasks with memory
would be useful for adaptive tests. In this paper, unless stated otherwise, all constructs are valid with tasks
with memory, even if we do not explore adaptive tests, just the fundamentals (such as difficulty, which is
required for adaptive tests).
2.5 Examples
In Fig. 1, we saw an example of the ‘relative numerousness’ task µnum. This can be seen as a stochastic task
class where the agent sees two rectangular grids (representing plates) where we have some black spots on it.
The action is just choosing left or right. If the choice is correct, the agent receives a response (and reward)
of 1. Otherwise, it receives 0.
For this task (µnum in Table 1), we have 4 × 4 ‘cells’, with the number of dots in each panel going
uniformly from 1 to 16. The size of each dot is uniformly distributed between 0.2 and 1, with 1 being the
diameter of the cell. In case the two panels had exactly the same number of dots, the pair would be discarded
and a new one would be generated. The use of different dot sizes is used to prevent subjects from choosing
the panels exclusively (or mostly) by their overall darkness (if there are more dots and all are equal sized
then the panel is always darker overall). In many studies, 80% success rate is considered as a level where
the subject is considered to perform the task successfully.
It is relatively easy to implement an agent that processes the image, recognises the shapes and counts
the dots. However, we are interested in seeing that it is also possible to score well in this task with an
agent that does not count at all. This agent, π1 performs a Monte Carlo approach and (virtually) throws
n points randomly inside the panel. It calculates the darkness of the panel as the percentage of points that
are black (i.e., it is inside a dot). At the end, the darkness of both panels is compared and the least dark
is chosen. If π1 uses n = 100 points for each panel, the agent is able to score 0.8675. Note that even if
there are (42 − 1)× (42 − 2) = 210 different number comparisons, the possible cell locations of the dots and
their different sizes make a virtually infinite number of different instances. Different results are obtained
if the number of points of the Monte Carlo method is changed. For instance, if π2 only uses n = 50 then
R(π2, µnum) = 0.8495. Still, if π3 only uses n = 10 then R(π3, µnum) = 0.746. Actually, with just one point,
π4 can still do significatively better than random: R(π4, µnum) = 0.575. Clearly, the computational cost
decreases from π1 to π2.
The response time task (µresponse in Table 1) is an interesting task to analyse. We could have a policy
π1 that is constantly checking the input to see if a response is needed. Assuming very high speed (e.g., it
can check the input, process it and see whether it has to react or not one million times per second), this π1
would score almost perfectly. However, it would also use many computational steps. Another algorithm π2
could just check 10 times per second (by using the instruction sleep(t), with t = 0.1s), and get a reasonable
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good result with much less computational cost than π1 (it is not exactly 100,000 less because when the signal
is not there the instructions to be executed are expected to be fewer than when the signal is there).
These two examples stress the issue of computational complexity and how it is interpreted in asynchronous
tasks.
3 Task difficulty
The first thing to clarify about difficulty is whether we apply it to the generation of the policy or the
application of the policy. The generation phase can be innate (by programming or nature) or acquired
(through training or learning). In comparative psychology and artificial intelligence it is usual to have these
two phases. It is very important to determine which phase we are referring to when talking about difficulty.
For instance, if we evaluate the ability of an animal of being able to do a task that involves counting, what we
want to know is whether the animal can acquire this ability. If we evaluate the ability of making calculations
(e.g., addition), we are clearly assuming that the system already has the algorithm for addition, and we are
just examining how well they do. This is clearly the case in many specific-task evaluation, such as driving a
car, game-playing, etc. The confusion comes because in both cases we will evaluate the performance on the
task in the same way.
Despite the same evalution, the notion of difficulty must be understood very differently. For instance,
the difficulty of the generation phase usually refers to tasks with many instances (how difficult is it to learn
to add from examples), while application usually refers to instances (how difficult “3+2” is compared to
“234+998”). In this section we will focus on task difficulty, leaving instance difficulty for the next section.
For instance, in the relative numerousness task, the generation difficulty depends on how much it takes to
program the algorithm for this task, the evolutionary cost of acquiring the algorithm or the learning cost of
acquiring the algorithm.
The difficulty of solving a stochastic task can be assessed by [45] (1) looking at the complexity of the
task (this is known as a structuralist approach), (2) looking at the complexity of the policy (or the resources
that are required by the subject) or (3) looking at the interaction between task and subject.
Our view of the generation difficulty is an “algorithmic difficulty”, which is basically the computational
steps required to build the policy algorithm, which depends on the tolerance level of the task, the interaction
and hints given by the task, the algorithm length, its computation cost and its verification cost. We now see
all these components below.
3.1 Agent resources, acceptability and interaction in asynchronous environ-
ments
The first thing we will require is the length of a policy. The length of an object x, denoted by L(x) expresses
the length of a string using a binary code for the object. This function can be applied to tasks and agents.
There is an important thing to consider here. If a program has the ability to self-modify, as it happens with
self-improvement agents, then when we measure L(π) of an agent π during a series of trials, the value might
change. However, one program can get extremely short by moving all the code to memory. Consequently,
analysing the evolution of the program during the execution of several trials is like analysing how memory
is evolving, so we will just consider the program π as it was before the evaluation.
The second thing we will require is the computation steps taken by a policy. In synchronous environments,
one option may be to add all the steps taken for all time cycles, but this clearly depends on the resolution
of the discrete time. Also, many transition functions may be just idle transitions, where the agent is just
checking whether something is happening. But imagine an agent that wants to wait for 10,000 transitions.
Even if very few operations are executed in each transition, these transitions count. To avoid this problem
another option is to calculate the maximum, as done in [22] with the so-called Ktmax. This is a very rough
approximation, as one single peak can make this very large. The mean or sum do not behave better, either.
Fortunately, here tasks are defined as asynchronous. When the agent needs to wait until a situation
or time is met, if the instruction sleep(t) is used, we should not consider all these ‘waiting’ times for the
computational steps. With this interpretation, the expected3 execution steps of π per trial when performing
3This has to be ‘expected’ if we consider stochastic environments or agents.
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task µ are denoted by S[ 7→ν](π, µ) for a time limit (τ) given by the task for each trial. Note that we consider
all the computational steps performed by π during all the ν evaluation trials for this expected value (they
are not added, though). If at any moment π enters an infinite loop4, then S[ 7→ν](π, µ) is infinite. As we are
using stochastic agents and environments, it is sufficient that one possible combination of the trials leads to
non-termination such that the expectation is infinite.
The third thing is about memory requirements (space). What if a policy requires much more memory
than another? This is also important in the context of several trials if the policy requires the memorisation
of the information of previous trials. We would do similary for the internal memory used by the policy,
considering that there are instructions to ask for more memory and free memory (or we can record up to
where the algorithm reaches if there is an internal tape). The notation is M[7→ν](π, µ). In this paper we
will not consider space because (1) the use of n bits of memory requires at least n computational steps, so
the latter are going to be considered anyway and (2) steps and bits are different units.
The fourth thing is verification. When we discuss the effort about finding a good policy, there must
be some degree of certainty that the policy is reasonably good. As tasks and agents are stochastic, this
verification is more cumbersome than in a non-stochastic case. We will discuss about this later on in the
paper.
For the moment, we will just combine the length of the policy and the computational steps, by defining
LS[7→ν](π, µ) , L(π)+ log S[7→ν](π, µ). Logarithms are always binary. We will explain later on why we apply
a logarithm over S.
The fifth thing is the tolerance level of the task. In many cases, we cannot talk about difficulty if there
is no threshold or limit for which we consider a policy acceptable. For instance, how difficult is a response
time task? It depends on where we put the threshold. How difficult is pacman? It depends on how many
points or time we want to achieve. It is true that some tasks have a response function R that can only be 0
or 1, and difficulty is just defined in terms of this goal. But many other tasks are not binary (goal-oriented),
and we need to establish a threshold for them. In our case, as the return function R goes from 0 to 1, we
can take 1 as the best response and set the threshold on 1 − ϵ. With this we first consider the notion of
acceptability.
We define acceptability in a straightforward way. The set of acceptable policies for task µ given a tolerance
ϵ is given by
A[ϵ, 7→ν](µ) , {π : R[7→ν](π, µ) ≥ 1− ϵ} (1)
Note that the combination of the expected value with a tolerance greater than 0 makes that the agent
can do terribly wrong in a few instances, provided it does well on many others. While the expected value
corresponds to the mean, we could use another statistic.
The sixth thing is the interaction and hints given by the task. This can be during the task (through
rewards or other observations) or throughout several trials. During the task, algorithms can use past ex-
perience and rewards to solve the task. For instance, µimit in Table 1 can be solved by simply observing
and copying, so actually the policy is an algorithm that does this. Similarly, if we have an agent that
is not reset after each trial, the algorithm can just learn from previous trials. For instance, µlrote in Ta-
ble 1 is solvable by an algorithm that memorises the correct string from a previous trial. In general,
we can have many different kinds of policies: ‘forever do action 1, wait(1), do action 2, wait(1)’,
which ignores the observations from the task completely, ‘forever output what µ outputs’, which uses
observations but ignores previous trials, ‘execute code1, if result of previous trial is lower than
0.5 then execute code2 in the following trials’, which uses the results of previous trials, ‘execute
random actions every 1 units of time. Memorise those actions that generate some change of
observations. Repeat them on the following trials’, which uses the observations of previous tri-
als, and ‘execute random actions every 1 units of time. Memorise those actions that receive
positive rewards. Repeat them on the following trials’, which uses the observations and rewards
(if there are) of previous trials. But some other ‘meta-algorithms’ are equally valid, such as ‘try algorithms
randomly from a given set of algorithms. If one has been good for the past five trials, use
it for ever’ or ‘use search heuristics of type 1 for the first 100 trials. If unsuccessful,
4Here, we are not concerned about halting, but rather that the number of steps is finite before the time limit τ .
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switch to heuristics of type 2’. These are just examples of whatever algorithm that can be used, in-
cluding self-improving algorithms.
The consideration of stochastic tasks is fundamental. For instance, consider the “relative numerousness”
task µnum again in Table 1. For each instance, the solution is just ‘left’ or ‘right’. The information that is
needed is just one bit. If we just put one possible instance in a task (i.e., a non-stochastic task) —and we
knew that the task is not stochastic—, then just one repetition of the same task instance would be enough
to find the solution, which will be very short (e.g., ‘choose the left board’). If the task can generate a
great or infinite number of instances, then the possibility of rote learning is reduced, and the policy would
incorporate some generalisation.
3.2 Difficulty as minimum resources
Having the the above issues into account we can define a first parametrised version of difficulty. Bear in
mind that these are general expressions whose goal is to understand what a function of difficulty is. In many
tasks, though, we may use a more practical (and particular) function of difficulty.
And now we are ready to link difficulty to resources. This is usual in algorithmic information theory,
but here we need to calculate the complexities of the policies (the agents) and not the problems (the tasks).
So, our first approach is to evaluate difficulty as the length of the shortest acceptable policy:
K [ϵ, 7→ν](µ) , min
π∈A[ϵ, 7→ν](µ)
L(π) (2)
The use of the notation K and the structure of the definition make it clear that this can be understood as
a version of Kolmogorov complexity for tasks, where instead of talking of the shortest program that generates
a string, we talk about the shortest program that solves the task.
Note that K is not only parametrised with a tolerance ϵ but also with the number of evaluation
trials. So our notion of difficulty depends on these parameters. We could think about letting be un-
limitted, so we would have K [ϵ, 7→∞](µ). This allows programs that use several trials, so we can have
a policy π that just does ‘enumerate all possible programs and execute each of them on as many
trials as needed and choose the best one for the subsequent trials’. Let us call this strategy5,
πfind−L−best. Assuming there is a finite acceptable policy, the length of this program πfind−L−best could
be taken as an upper bound for K because this program is going to find the policy if given infinite trials,
just by enumeration. For some tasks, of course, there might be other programs that could be shorter than
πfind−L−best. For instance, in the simple imitation task πimit, it is expected that the coding of the pro-
gram ‘copy the observation to the action’ is shorter than πfind−L−best. Examples for some of tasks
are shown on Table 2.
We can also consider K [ϵ,∞,7→1](µ), but in this case it cannot be a program that searches for the policy
across several trials. For some kinds of tasks, especially those that do not give partial indications during
the task, this will account for the shortest policy that gives an ϵ-acceptable solution without looking at the
task at all. For others, the task will provide the required information (like an input) but the interaction will
be just that. For instance, in the relative numerousness task, depending on the tolerance, the Monte Carlo
policy could be a good option, as it is a very short policy. Actually, a version of the Monte Carlo with a
huge amount of points would be better, disregarding its high computational cost, since computationl steps
are not taken into account. For the simple imitation task ‘copy the observation to the action’ would
still be chosen. It may seem counterintuitive to analyse a situation with just one trial with a policy that
cannot be found with just one trial (the chances are actually about 2−L), but here we are trying to measure
difficulty. Examples for some of the taks are shown on Table 2.
The problem about K is that it does not take computational cost into account (this also makes it
uncomputable). A common solution, inspired by Levin’s Kt (see, e.g., [43] or [44]), is to define:
Kt[ϵ, 7→ν](µ) , min
π∈A[ϵ, 7→ν](µ)
LS[7→ν](π, µ) (3)
Note that the above has two expectations: one in LS and another one inside A. The interpretation of the
above expression is a measure of effort, as used with the concept of computational information gain with Kt
5In a way, this strategy is like an AIXI-like algorithm [34].
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Task K[ϵ,7→∞](µ) K[ϵ,7→1](µ) Kt[ϵ,7→∞](µ) Kt[ϵ,7→1](µ) I
µnum πfind−L−best =⇒ ‘Monte Carlo policy
with many points’
πfind−LS−best =⇒ ‘Monte Carlo policy
with a few points’
M
µRPM πfind−L−best =⇒ ‘Shortest rpm solver’ πfind−LS−best =⇒ ‘LS-optimal rpm
solver’
M
µCtest ‘Monte Carlo search
on sequence patterns’
‘Monte Carlo search
on sequence patterns’
‘Levin search on
sequence patterns’
‘Levin search on
sequence patterns’
-
µresponse ‘react with minimum
sleep periods’
‘react with minimum
sleep periods’
‘react with fair
sleep periods’
‘react with fair
sleep periods’
-
µmaze ‘right-hand traversal’ ‘right-hand traversal’ ‘LS-optimal traversal’ ‘LS-optimal traversal’ -
µpacman πfind−L−best =⇒ ‘eat and escape from
predators’
πfind−LSbest =⇒ ‘eat and escape from
predators’
M
µtrans πfind−L−best =⇒ ‘shortest-translator’ πfind−LSbest =⇒ ‘LS-optimal-translator’ M
µimit ‘copy the observation
to the action’
‘copy the observation
to the action’
‘copy the observation
to the action’
‘copy the observation
to the action’
-
µguess ‘guess randomly until
reward’
‘guess randomly until
reward’
‘guess randomly until
reward’
‘guess randomly until
reward’
-
µeidetic ‘repeat what has been
seen’
‘repeat what has been
seen’
‘repeat what has been
seen’
‘repeat what has been
seen’
-
µsrote ‘output
decompressible TEXT’
‘output
decompressible TEXT’
‘efficiently
decompressible TEXT’
‘efficiently
decompressible TEXT’
-
µlrote ‘copy text from
previous trial’
‘output
decompressible TEXT’
‘copy text from
previous trial’
‘efficiently
decompressible TEXT’
H
µadd ‘addition by
incrementing’
‘addition by
incrementing’
‘efficient addition’ ‘efficient addition’ -
µsudoku ‘exhaustive sudoku
search’
‘exhaustive sudoku
search’
‘efficient sudoku
solver’
‘efficient sudoku
solver’
-
Table 2: Some of the illustrative tasks defined in Table 1 and the kind of policies that could lead to the
minimisation of the complexity measures K or Kt with or without history. The cases with 7→ 1 are blind
to previous trials, either because there is not any previous trial or because the agent has no memory or is
reinitialised for each trial. For those where πfind−L−best or πfind−LS−best appears, we assume there is no
better policy (in terms of L or LS) that achieves ϵ. The last column shows the few cases where there is a
difference between many trials or just one trial. This effect of incrementality can be reflected in terms of
algorithm self-improvement or meta-search, represented by M (and we also show a right arrow meaning that
in the end it will be executing the algorithm on the right), and the use of history in other ways, H.
in [17].
We first consider Kt[ϵ,7→∞](µ). With this we allow for as many trials during evaluation. In other words,
effort can be put in finding the policy, but the policy must be efficient. Again, this would sometimes
end up choosing ‘enumerate all possible programs and execute each of them on as many trials
as needed and choose the best efficient one’. This happens because despite its enormous computa-
tional cost, when the trials go to ∞ the algorithm may finally find the particular policy and start exploiting
it. As it is the expected value for the infinite number of trials that counts, this policy is efficient for an
infinite number of trials. Let us call this strategy6, πfind−LS−best, which is again of not much practical use.
Examples for some of the task are shown on Table 2.
We can compare with Kt[ϵ, 7→1](µ). In this case, the meta-policies such as πfind−LS−best are avoided,
but we have that the policy cannot take advantage of previous trials. In a way, this version is measuring
difficulty when the agents have no memory (or are reinitialised).
All these options are summarised in Table 2, which shows the tasks introduced in Table 1 with the values
of several difficulty functions. We see that in some cases, the previous trials or part of the trial itself can be
used to learn a pattern (as shown in the last columns).
The cases of µsrote and µlrote are significant. Both are just non-stochastic tasks that can be just done by
rote-learning once a couple of instances are seen. In fact, this is an extreme case of stochastic tasks where
there is a relevant part that is constant. We see that both are considered simple when there are several trials
(either by memorising a short string or by using a policy that just memorises and copies it from the previous
instance). The use of this copy&paste policy can only be appreciated when the size of the thing to be copied
6In a way, this strategy is like an AIXItl-like algorithm [60].
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has a certain value (for short strings, nothing can beat the policy with the string itself). This is a crucial
example of why a blind search that tries to find policies without looking (and learning from) previous trials
can be less efficient than another looking at previous trials. In other words, in an interactive scenario, an
enumeration-like search might not be the best thing to do. This has been realised in some modifications of
Levin’s universal search for agents.
Kt puts together the length of the policy and the computationl steps it takes, including both searching
and execution. This makes it consider any meta-search procedure inside the policy, provided that this (with
the information of the task) is more effective than getting the policy from nothing. In other words, if the
task gives hints and there is a short and fast procedure that can use these hints to find the policy, then the
exrpesion of Kt will give this policy. Anyway, the use of Kt is related to Levin’s universal search [43, 44], as if
we measure the computational steps that are required to find the algorithm that minimises Kt we have to go
approximately through 2L(π) programs with their corresponding execution steps of S. By multiplying these
two terms and calculating a binary logarithm we have Kt. This connection, which will be better described
later on, allows us to define the unit of difficulty as the logarithm of computational steps.
We have said why Kt[ϵ, 7→∞](µ) is not completely satisfying, since for some problems, the meta-search
policy πfind−LS−best is chosen. The reason is that, despite the great computationl effort of πfind−LS−best,
this can concentrate on the first millions of trials and then progressively switching the behaviour so that the
best policy so far is used. The problem is because we are calculating Kt for an infinite number of trials. We
have also discussed that Kt[ϵ, 7→1](µ) cannot take history of previous trials.
An option as an upper-bound measure of difficulty in between would be ~(µ) , Kt[ϵ,7→ν](µ), for a finite
ν and given ϵ. That means that any search has to be done during evaluation and the computational steps
here will be taken into account (if ν is not too large). In general, if ν is very large, then the last evaluations
will prevail and any initial effort to find the policies and start applying them will not have enough weight.
On the contrary, if ν is small, then those policies that invest in analysing the environment will be penalised.
That means that we will need to invest as little computation steps and trials to find an acceptable policy
and then execute it for as many trials as needed to make R ≥ 1 − ϵ. This is in a way a trade-off between
exploration and exploitation. It also requires a good assessment of the metasearch procedure to verify the
policy so it can go to exploitation. In any case, the notion of difficulty depends, in some tasks, on ν. We
will come back to this issue later on, as we will analyse the ‘verification cost’, and how the number of trials
ν can be derived by a confidence degree such that the policy solving the problem is found and the trials can
stop.
4 Task instances, task composition and decomposition
Up to this point we have dealt with a first approach to task difficulty. A task includes (infinitely) many task
instances. What about instance difficulty? Does it make sense? In case it does, instance difficulty would be
very useful for adaptive tests, as we could make the stochastic task adaptive and start with simple instances
and adapt their difficulty to the ability of the subject (as in adaptive testing in psychometrics).
However, there are many confounding factors to determine the difficulty of a single instance. For instance,
for a division task we may have these two instances: 6/3 and 1252/626. If the task is stochastic and includes
many divisions, a policy that actually makes divisions will pay off. But if we create a task with just 6/3
or 1252/626 as only instances, in both cases the solution would be just 2, which is not only equal for both
instances, but also a value that has no relation whatsoever to the difficulty of these instances.
The key issue is that instance difficulty must be defined relative to a task. At first sight, the difference in
difficulty between 6/3 and 1252/626 is just a question of computational steps, as the latter usually requires
more computational steps if a general division algorithm is used. But what about 13528/13528? It looks an
easy instance. Using a general division algorithm, it may be the case that it takes more computational steps
than 1522/626. If we see it easy is because there are some shortcuts in our algorithm to make divisions.
These shortcuts are frequently applied instead of the general procedure. One of the shortcuts would be to
return 1 if both arguments are equal. Of course, we can think about algorithms with many shortcuts, but
then the notion of difficulty depends on how many shortcuts it has. In the end, this would make instance
difficulty depend on a given algorithm for the task (and not the task itself). This would boil down to the steps
taken by the algorithm, as in computational complexity. For the relative numerousness task, for instance,
13
the difficulty of an instance would be radically different if we are thinking about a counting policy (for which
all instances are approximately equally easy) or we are thinking about a Monte Carlo policy (which depends
on the difference in the total area of the circles, as the algorithm can stop when the difference is statistically
significant).
We can of course take a structuralist approach, by linking the difficulty of an instance to a series of
characteristics of the instance, such as its size, the similarities of their ingredients, etc. This is one of the
usual approaches in psychology and many other areas, including evolutionary computation, but does not
lead to a general view of what instance difficulty really is. For the divisions above, one can argue that
13528/13528 is more regular than 1252/626, and that is why the first is easier than the second. However,
this is false in general, as 1352813528 is by no means easier than any other exponentiation.
Some other approaches also link the difficulty of an instance or problem to the “probability of failure”
[7] or to the “probability-of-failure and mean time-to-solution” [4]. The probability of failure can be defined
in terms of one policy (so we would have again a notion of difficulty dependent to the best policy solving
the task), but another perspective is “the likelihood that a randomly chosen program will fail for any given
input value” [7]. This is interesting. Apparently, it looks like the population-based approach in psychology
(apply the instance to some individuals and record times and success rates), as it is based on a population
of programs.
Here, we have several problems to follow this idea. We would need a population7. Also, we have that
difficulty depends on computational cost and success rates, which are expressed in very different units. If
the difficulty of a task is 8 (in logarithm of steps), what does it mean if we say that one of its instances has
a difficulty of 0.3 (in proportion)? In any case, we may agree that computational cost and success rate are
relevant, but they do not work in this way as a function of difficulty.
4.1 Instance difficulty as rareness
Instead of considering all policies8, we can consider the best policy. The insight comes when we see that best
policies may change with variable values of ϵ. This leads to the view of the relative difficulty of an instance
with respect to a task as the minimum LS for any possible tolerance of a policy such that the instance is
accepted.
In order to formalise this concept, we must first formalise the notion of instance. For stochastic tasks,
an instance is simply the very task for which its random behaviour is fixed. This can be obtained with the
underlying model by setting a fixed string to the random tape or by setting a seed to the random generator
(as in many computer languages). We denote by µσ an instance of µ by setting seed σ.
We first define the set of all optimal policies for varying tolerances ϵ0 as:
Opt
[7→ν]
LS (µ) ,
{
argmin
π∈A[ϵ0, 7→ν](µ)
LS[ 7→ν](π, µ)
}
ϵ0∈[0,1]
(4)
And now we define the instance difficulty of µσ with respect to µ as:
~[ϵ, 7→ν](µσ|µ) , min
π∈Opt[7→ν]LS (µ)∩A[ϵ, 7→ν](µσ)
LS[7→ν](π, µ) (5)
The interpretation of the formulae above is as follows. Take all the optimal policies (in terms of LS) for
varying values of ϵ. Sort them by their ϵ increasingly. The first one that is acceptable for µσ gives the best
policy for µ that covers µσ. The LS of this policy is the relative difficulty of µσ with respect to µ. Note
how the order of the minimisation is arranged in equations 4 and 5 such that for the many policies that
only cover µσ but do not solve many of the other instances, these are not considered because they are not
in OptLS.
Let us see this for the relative numerousness task. Imagine the instance in Figure 1. Let us choose a
task tolerance ϵ = 0.1, which we call the reference tolerance. Now consider all the possible policies solving
7We could assume a universal distribution of policies. This is related to the solution presented in this paper, since the
shortest policies have a great part of the mass of this distribution.
8As said above, we could also consider a universal distribution of policies, which would give a high probability to the best
policy.
14
the original task (considering many instances) when we vary the tolerance. For instance, for tolerances ϵ0
from 1 to 0.5 we have that the best policy is most likely one that always chooses left (or right), assuming
that we have a balanced proportion of instances where the answer is left or right. For these tolerances, the
error of this policy will always be acceptable. However, the error for µσ will be worse than the reference task
tolerance level sets (ϵ = 0.1). The interest thing comes next, when we increase the tolerances. There might
be a policy for tolerances ϵ0 0.3 or 0.2 such that is also a policy for µ
σ with the reference task tolerance
ϵ = 0.1. In this case, the LS of this policy would be the difficulty of the instance. In other words, difficulty
of an instance is the minimum effort for the whole task such that the instance is well covered.
This notion of relative difficulty is basically a notion of consilience with the task. If we have an instance
whose optimal policy is unrelated to the optimal policy for the rest, then this instance will not be covered
until the tolerance becomes very low. Of course, this will depend on whether the algorithmic content of
solving the instance can be accommodated into the general policy. This is closely related to concepts such
as consilience, coherence and intensionality [16, 26, 30, 18, 17]. If the instance is an outlier then it will be
more difficult because it requires extra information to accommodate into the policy but also because the
probability that it appears as part of the policy from the task is very low and hence it is hard that this
case could be covered. In a way, difficulty is a notion of ‘rareness’ —in some senses of the term, special and
unlikely.
A different case is when there are many instances of some kind that are different from the rest of instances
in the task. In this case, it is not an instance that is rare, but a set of instances, and it is better to analyse
this in terms of task decomposition, as we will see in the following section.
Finally, it must be said that equation 5 might be undefined for some instances, as none of the optimal
policies for varying values of ϵ0 is able to cover it appropriately. This of course implies that in these cases
there is no policy for the task with no tolerance (ϵ0 = 0). This is related to whether we define tolerance with
respect to 1 or with respect to the best policy. In the latter case, the acceptable policy with no tolerance
would always exist. But still, some instances might not be covered. That does not imply necessarily that
there are no policies for these instances, but that there is no acceptable policy for these instances such that
it is also an acceptable policy for all the other instances.
We can now see another example. For instance, in a task where the agent has to guess the following
symbol in a letter series, such as the task µCtest in Table 1 or Thurstone’s letter series [56], we may wonder
why the series aaaaaaa seems easier than aacaeag. Two explanations are here. First, given the previous
definition, we can see that for high tolerance levels some simple policies may solve some series (e.g., a program
that just solves arithmetic and geometric series would solve the first but not the last one). As a result, these
simple incomplete policy would score some results if arithmetic and geometric series are a relevant proportion
of all series. This is exactly what the program passing IQ tests from [50] did, using some predefined rules
for some common sequences. This would actually give a grading of instances, which some of them being in
the same class (each class given by each of the policies returned by 4). Second, we can of course assume
the best policy overall (e.g., by considering the given tolerance ϵ or tolerance 0). The policy in this case, as
shown in Table 2, would be a kind of Levin’s search on the possible patterns. The difficulty would just be
the computational steps of using this algorithm for the policy. As we mentioned above, there is a connection
between the logarithm of the steps required by Levin’s search and Kt, the measure of instance difficulty that
was used in the C-test [29, 15].
Both explanations are sufficiently compelling to see whether both can be combined. A mixture of the
two above approaches could be to modify equation 5 where L is taken from the task policy while S is taken
for µσ, i.e.:
Kt[ϵ, 7→ν](µσ|µ) , min
π∈Opt[7→ν]Kt (µ)∩A[ϵ, 7→ν](µσ)
LS[7→ν](π, µσ) (6)
This could be a more elaborate version of difficulty. Nonetheless, we must say that any of the above
options is not proposed as a definitive policy that may give an intuitive value of difficulty for every possible
task and instance. Our goal here is to show some of the ingredients about the notion of difficulty, and provide
some useful references to construct one personalised version of instance difficulty for a given situation. Being
more or less elaborate, we think that the principles must be the same. For instance, we emphasise that all
of them are defined in terms of computational steps, so they actually measure algorithmic effort.
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Of course, there will be occasions where the notion of difficulty for an instance is controversial. For
instance, for a division task, imagine 2525/8527, and now consider two different division algorithms π1
and π2, which both are approximately equally efficient and short (same LS). However, for π1 we have
that 7674/2558 is solved very easily but 7674/2558 takes much more steps for π2. Using any of the above
definitions, the difficulty will depend on the reference machine that calculates length and complexity. Other
more robust options, such as considering not only the minimum in equations 4 and 5 (or 6), have already
been mentioned, and would lead to more complicated notions of difficulty. In any case, they could be thought
as future work.
4.2 Task composition and decomposition
Now the question is to consider how we can put several tasks together. For instance, if we include µnum
and µRPM from Table 1 in the same test, does it make sense to aggregate the results? The first problem
is that the aggregation of several responses that are not commensurate makes no sense (perhaps for one
the responses go from 0 to 0.1 while for the other they go from 0.5 to 1, with very different distributions
of results9). One alternative to a normalisation is to use a tolerance level for the tasks. This gives further
justification to eq. 1, where A was introduced. Given two tolerance levels for each task we can see whether
this leads to similar or different difficulties for each task. For instance, if the difficulties are very different,
then the task will be dominated by the easy one. In the previous example, the µnum is much easier than
the µRPM . By using different tolerance levels we can determine whether we want both tasks to have the
same relevance or not. In fact, we do not really need to use different values of ϵ, as we can find a monotonic
transformation of (one of) the responses such that the ϵ can be the same for both, leading to the same
difficulty. Given any task, any monotonic transformation of the responses leads to another task such that
there is another ϵ that leads to the same acceptability set.
Comparing the difficulties of the tasks for a response value is important to undertand what the compo-
sition really means, but we have not defined what a composition is. Given two stochastic tasks, it does not
make sense to make the union of the tasks, but rather to calculate a mixture. In particular, the composition
of tasks µ1 and µ2 with weight α ∈ [0, 1], denoted by αµ1⊕ (1−α)µ2, is defined by a stochastic choice, using
a biased coin (e.g., using α), between the two tasks. Note that this choice is made for each trial. It is easy
to see that if both µ1 and µ2 are asyncronous-time stochastic tasks, this mixture also is.
Similar to composition we can talk about decomposition, which is just understood in a straightforward
way. Basically, µ is decomposable into µ1 and µ2 if there is an α and two tasks µ1 and µ2 such that
µ = αµ1 ⊕ (1− α)µ2.
Now, it is interesting to have a short look at what happens with difficulty when two tasks are put together.
Given a difficulty function ~, we would like to see that if ~(αµ1 ⊕ (1− α)µ2) ≈ α~(µ1) + (1− α)~(µ2) then
both tasks are related, and there is a common policy that takes advantage of some similarities. However, in
order to make sense of this expression, we need to consider some values of α and fix a tolerance. With high
tolerance the above will always be true as ~ is close to zero independently of the task. With intermediate
tolerances, if the difficulties are not even, the policies for the composed task will invest more resources for
the easiest ‘subtask’ and will neglect the most difficult ‘subtask’. For instance, if there is an easy policy for
µ1 achieving response 0.8, but for µ2 the policies are much more difficult if the same level of response is
aimed at, one can make do with a switch, use the easy policy for µ1 and manage with an easy policy for µ2
achieving response 0.4. If α = 0.5 then we would have overall response of 0.6, which may be acceptable for
intermediate tolerances. Finally, using low tolerances (or even 0) for the above expressions may have more
meaning, as the policy must take into account both tasks. In fact, for tolerance 0 the value of α that is not
0 or 1 is not relevant.
In fact, there are some cases for which some relations can be established. Assume 0 tolerance, and
imagine that for every 1 > α > 0 we have ~(αµ1 ⊕ (1 − α)µ2) ≈ α~(µ1). If this is the case, it means that
we require the same effort to find a policy for both tasks than for one alone. We can see that task µ1 covers
task µ2. In other words, the optimal policy for µ1 works for µ2. Note that this does not mean that every
policy for µ1 works for µ2. Finally, if µ1 covers µ2 and vice versa, we can say that both tasks are equivalent.
We can also calculate a distance as d(µ1, µ2) , 2~(0.5µ1 ⊕ 0.5µ2) − ~(µ1) − ~(µ2). Clearly, if µ1 = µ2
then we have 0 distance. For tolerance 0 we also have that if µ2 has difficulty close to 0 but µ1 has a high
9One can normalise them by a cumulative distribution, again if we can figure out a population or distribution of policies.
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difficulty h1, and both tasks are unrelated but can be distinguished without effort, then we have that the
distance is h1.
These ideas and properties can be related to concepts such as (normalised) information distance [6, 61],
especially the similarity of two tasks, with the appropriate caution, as here we are talking about interactive
tasks and we are using the complexity of the policies and not the complexity of the description of the tasks.
Two tasks with very similar (shortest) descriptions can have very different policies, and two tasks with
very different (shortest) descriptions can have the same general policy. In the case of task composition and
distance, we have seen that there are features for tasks that are fundamental, such as their magnitudes
(which can be made even by the use of an appropriate tolerance or a monotonic function), their original
difficulties and also whether both tasks can be distinguished easily (two similar tasks can be difficult to tell
apart and putting them together could require a great extra effort).
Nonetheless, there are many questions we can analyse with this conceptualisation. For instance, how far
can we decompose? That depends on how we decompose. For an infinite distribution (e.g., many stochastic
tasks could be seen in this way), there are infinitely finer decompositions, each of them containing an infinite
number of instances. But there are some other decompositions that will lead to tasks with very similar
instances or even with just one instance. Let us consider the addition task µadd with a soft geometrical
distribution p on the numbers to be added. With tolerance 0, the optimal policy is given by a short and
efficient policy to addition. We can decompose addition into µadd1 and µadd2, where µadd1 contains all
the summations 0 + x, and µadd2 incorporates all the rest. Given the distribution p, we can find the α
such that µadd = αµadd1 ⊕ (1 − α)µadd2. From this decomposition, we see that µadd2 will have the same
difficulty, as the removal of summations 0 + x does not simplify the problem. However, µadd1 is simple now.
But, interestingly, µadd2 still covers µadd1. We can figure out many decompositions, such as additions with
and without carrying. Also, as the task gives more relevance to short additions because of the geometrical
distribution, we may decompose the task in many one-instance tasks and a few general tasks. In the one-
instance tasks we would put simple additions such as 1+5 that we would just rote learn (the optimal policy
for these cases alone is just rote learn). In fact, it is quite likely that in order to improve the efficiency of
the general policy for µadd the policy includes some tricks to treat some particular cases or easy subsets.
This can perfectly happen with some of the task difficulty functions seen before, such as Kt[ϵ,07→1](µ). This
is also consistent with many cognitive analyses of how humans perform addition (see, e.g., [5]). The use of
decompositions can be useful to analyse many other cases. For instance, if we make a decomposition of π
into π1 and π2 with a high α, and get that the difficulty of π1 is low then it is quite likely that the original
policy internally incorporates this separation. This can also happen with difficult instances (or subtasks) if
tolerance is 0, as they can be incorporated in a rote-learning way. Also, it may be interesting to compare this
(with tolerance 0) to the notion of instance difficulty seen in the previous section (which plays with levels of
tolerance).
The opposite direction is if we think about how far we can reach by composing tasks. Again, we can
compose tasks ad eternum without reaching more general tasks necessarily. The big question is whether
we can analyse abilities with the use of compositions and difficulties. In other words, are there some tasks
such that the acceptable policies for these tasks are frequently useful for many other tasks? That could
be evaluated by looking what happens to a task µ1 with a given difficulty h1 if it is composed with any
other task µ2 of some task class. If the difficulty of the composed task remains constant (or increases very
slightly), we can say that µ1 covers µ2. Are there tasks that cover many other tasks? This is actually what
psychometrics and artificial intelligence are trying to unveil. For instance, in psychometrics, we can define a
task µ1 with some selection of arithmetic operations and see that those who perform well on these operations
have a good arithmetic ability. In our perspective, we would need to check whether the selection of operators
that are evaluated (+, −, etc.) has some kind of optimal policy that does not help with the general problem.
If this does not happen, then we could extrapolate (theoretically and not experimentally) that this task µ1
covers a range of arithmetic tasks.
As more general we get with composition, things will become harder (but not impossible). Can we define
a task for inductive ability and show that this will cover every other pure inductive task? Or that it will
be helpful for other tasks featuring inductive abilities? In artificial intelligence, this is usually the set of
general techniques (in vision, pattern recognition, natural language processing) that are reused again and
again in different applications. An ultimate question is whether there is a general task such that it is useful
for every other task (like general intelligence or the g factor), especially in cases with many trials (e.g., using
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Kt[ϵ, 7→∞](µ)). The view of Table 2 and some of the optimal policies being πfind−LS−best suggest that for
very ‘large’ tasks, these general, meta-search, algorithms may be good policies for these tasks.
All of the above is just some directions that should be analysed in detail with separate research pieces.
In practice, even if difficulty functions such as Kt[ϵ, 7→1](µ) may be computationally expensive to calculate for
many tasks, these set a conceptual framework to analyse many of these questions. For instance, the notion of
task breadth can be analysed in this context. There have been several (informal) approaches or expressions
of relevance of task breadth [14, 49] or the notion of intellectual breadth (though applied to an agent [13] and
not to a task). Some of them are relative to other tasks or to humans, such as the one suggested (but not
fully developed) with the Turing Ratio [46]. With the observation of how difficulty changes with composition
and decomposition we could try to give a a proper formalisation of task breadth or, alternatively, we may
reach the conclusion that task breadth is not a meaningful notion.
Finally, the additivity of difficulty with composition could be analysed, and compared to other kinds
of combination. Imagine two tasks µ1 and µ2 that are put together (sequentially) as a new joint µ, and
an observation signals whether the agent is performing well for each of the two parts. A policy could
be ‘Identify parts. Find the policy for the first part and the second part independently’.
That means that the policy could do separate searches. For instance, in the worst case (or using a Levin
search) we could have 2L(π1)+2L(π2) possible choices instead of 2L(π1)+L(π2), where π1 and π2 are the partial
programs that solve the partial subtasks. A concatenation of tasks is very different from a composition, but
if agents have memory, we could find cases where there are connections.
4.3 Agent response curves
One of the usefulness of difficulty is the analysis of agents according to how they behave in terms of the
difficulty of the problem. This can be done with the so-called agent response curves, introduced in [25]
following the notion of item response curves in psychometrics. Let us see briefly how these curves can be
defined for tasks or task instances.
We first define A[ϵ, 7→ν](π, µ) , 1ifπ ∈ A[ϵ, 7→ν](µ)and 0 otherwise. A task class is defined as a pair ⟨M,pM ⟩,
where M is a set of tasks or task instances, and pM is a distribution. Note that with this definition, task
classes are stochastic tasks (but not all stochastic tasks can be seen as classes). We also consider a difficulty
function h (over tasks, or over task instances relative to the overall task).
We can group those of the same difficulty:
Ψ
[ϵ,7→ν]
h (π,M, pM ) ,
∑
µ∈M,~[ϵ, 7→ν](µ)=h
pM (µ|h) · A[ϵ,7→ν](π, µ) (7)
If we represent Ψh on the y-axis versus h on the x-axis we have a so-called agent response curve, as shown
in Figure 2. In order to have a nice view of the figure, we need to investigate how the points are derived.
Do we have elements of M with the same value of h? Otherwise, the values of the y-axis would all be either
0 or 1. In order to observe values between them we must have several elements in M with the same of h.
If h is a continuous function and this is not the case, we can group h by intervals. This can also be done
for convenience if there are no elements for some regions of h, so that we get a ‘continuous’ curve without
empty regions.
The important thing, however, is how it works. Here we have three particular cases:
• If the elements of M are stochastic tasks each and we use a non-relative version of difficulty, the curve
may have a look very much the same as Figure 2. For some of the difficulty functions seen in the
previous sections (K in particular10), it can be shown that for every agent there is an h such that above
it, Ψh is zero (this h is actually the length of the algorithm of the agent).
• If the elements of M are variants of the same task by varying the value of ϵ then we have that the curve
is a non-increasing step function, where the leap of the step is located at the difficulty h of the variant
of the task such that the tolerance equals the achievement of agent π. This curve is of course not very
10For Kt this cannot be proved in general unless we include the computational steps the policy takes into R. However, this
would go against a behavioural evaluation. Nonetheless, for those tasks for which there is some relevance of time to the R and
assuming non-infinite speed of the agent, we can show that this is bounded.
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Figure 2: An agent response curve.
informative for one agent. However, this could be interesting if we aggregate these ‘step’ curves for a
population of agents.
• If the elements of M are instances and we use a relative version of difficulty, assuming that the function
is defined for all instances, we may have non-zero values for arbitrary high values of h, even for very
simple agents (for instance, if an agent only solves a single instance, but this instance is difficult). At
least this h can be bounded by the h of the task (if it exists for 0 tolerance).
For the last case, we can see that if there are many instances with the same difficulty (or we aggregate values
of h in intervals), then we are considering an average of results for many instances and the shape will be
mostly non-decreasing, like the one shown in Figure 2.
5 Difficulty as Levin search with stochastic verification
We decided to associate difficulty to the smallest number of computational steps such that we get an acceptable
policy for a given tolerance ϵ. This depends on how many alternative algorithms we need to try before we
find the right one and how much time we require in order to discard the bad ones and confirm the correct
one. This boils down to a measure of difficulty that depends on how many options need to be explored and
the time that each of them takes. Their product will give an upper bound of the number of computational
steps to find the best acceptable policy to a problem, i.e., its difficulty.
In previous sections we considered the length of the policy and the logarithm of its computational time
through their combination LS, which finally led to the function Kt[ϵ, 7→ν](µ). As we argued, this is given by
the realisation that in order to find a policy of length L(π) we have to try approximately 2L(π) algorithms if
we enumerate programs from small to large (this is basically what Levin search does, as we will see below).
Considering that we can also gradually increase the computational steps that we devote for each of them, we
get 2L(π) ·S(π, µ), whose logarithm is represented by Kt. This is why we say that the unit of Kt is logarithm
of computational steps11.
If we try to extend this notion to tasks, the first, and perhaps most obvious and important difference with
traditional Levin’s universal search is that tasks are stochastic. Consequently, several trials may be needed
for discarding a bad policy and the verification of a good one. This is specially the case when the response
can have a high variance. Even a good policy can give bad results eventually, and we cannot discard a good
policy just because it fails for one trial. We require repetitions, i.e., more trials, to know whether the policy
is good for the whole task on average or not. Intuitively, a pair of task and policy with low variability in the
response (results) will be easier to be verified than another where results behave more stochastically. For
11[47] says “this allows time to be measured in bits”, but I think that this is misleading, as there is more information involved.
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Feature Kind of difficulty it represents Notation Depends on
Information content (size) of π Transmission (language or coding) L(π) -
Execution steps of π Demonstration S(π, µ) -
Expected value of response of π - R(π, µ) -
True variance of response of π - Var[R(π, µ)] -
Verification trials of π - B(π, µ) R and Var[R(π, µ)]
Finding effort steps of π Finding (trivial or no verification) LS(π, µ) L and S
Verification steps of π - W(π, µ) S and B
Total effort steps of π Search (with target) F(π, µ) L and W
Table 3: Different features of a policy π given a task µ.
instance, consider two possible policies: a and b. Problem µ1 gets response 0 or 1 (with equal probability)
for policy a whereas it gives a constant value of 0 for policy b. This case is more difficult to find and verify
than another problem µ2 where policy a consistently gets a constant response of 0.5. Note that in both
cases, the expected response for policies a and b is 0.5 and 0 respectively, but it is intuitive to think that the
first case is more difficult to find (actually because it is harder to verify).
The second difference with classical Levin search is that the search algorithm goes through several trials,
and it is not clear that the agent can interrupt the trial if a policy does not look promising. Nonetheless, we
can consider that the search algorithm can also do some sleep operations so that basically nothing is done
until a new algorithm can be tried for the following trials.
The third difference is that we can think about a Levin search with memory, as some of the observations on
previous trials may be crucial (whereas Levin search is basically a blind search). So we need that the policies
that are tried could also be search procedures over several trials. That means that Levin search actually
becomes a metasearch, which considers all possible search procedures, ordered by size and resources12. Only
in this way we can properly give an intuitive measure of difficulty for µsrote and µlrote in Table 2.
This is just a realisation that for interactive stochastic scenarios, verification is not just one execution,
but many if things are stochastic, because there is noise, the systems are not foolproof, etc. In a way, we are
looking for more general and robust searches. This view is not very different to many evolutionary processes
that have tried many policies in a world that is basically stochastic.
Another important thing is that in order to calculate the computational steps of a search, this search
must stop at some point and say that the good policy has been found. However, as tasks are stochastic, we
can never have complete certainty that a good policy has been found. An option is to consider a confidence
level, such that the search invests as fewer computational steps as possible to have a degree of confidence
1− δ of having found an ϵ-acceptable policy. This clearly resembles a PAC (probably approximate correct)
scenario [?].
Before starting, Table 3 summarises some of the notations we will use. We must also bear in mind that we
are focussing on a view of difficulty when the policy is found by search (be it “intellectual”, “evolutionary”
or “cultural”, as Turing distinguished [57]). However, the table also shows that there are other ways of
acquiring a policy (by transmission, by demonstration or by search).
5.1 Levin universal search for stochastic tasks and/or policies
Levin’s universal search has very interesting properties, as any inversion problem can be solved optimally
(except for a multiplicative constant) [44, pp. 577–580]. It is related (and with approximately similar
properties) to the SIMPLE search algorithm in [44, pp. 579], but with the advantage that the execution
of programs does not need threads or traces to be kept in order to resume previously explored program
executions (at the cost of repeating part of previous executions). The important thing is how they relate
the length of a program with their execution (and verification) time.
The traditional Levin’s universal search is defined as follows:
12There are some variants and adaptations of Levin search for interactive scenarios and MDPs [33, 52, 34, 53, 51]. Here it
is not our goal to find a search that is useful to design intelligent agents but to find some expressions that help us refine our
definition of task difficulty.
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Definition 1. Levin’s universal search. Given a string x and a universal prefix-free Turing machine U ,
for which programs can be enumerated, we conduct several phases, starting from phase 1. For phase i, we
execute all possible programs p with L(p) ≤ i for at most si = 2i−L(p) steps each, including in this limit si
the steps13 needed to verify whether U(p) = x. Once we find and verify the first successful policy the search
is stopped. Otherwise we continue until we complete the phase and then to a next stage i+ 1.
The number of steps to execute p and verify that it produces x or not14 is denoted by W (p, x). We can
determine an upper bound of the total number of steps taken by this procedure. While one could expect
that this is s ≤ (k − 1)2k+1 + 2, this is significantly reduced by the use of prefix-free programs, so Kraft
inequality can be used, having:
Theorem 1. ([44, pp. 580, claim 7.5.1]) The number of steps s taken by Levin search given by definition
1 is bounded by:
s ≤ 2k+1
where
k = L(p) + log(W (p, x)) (8)
and p is the first program that meets the stop condition.
Even if we can use Kraft inequality and we get a much tighter upper bound, it seems that this bound is
still rather loose, as many programs may stop before the alloted stops. However, as we can think of UTMs
for which all programs of size lower than a constant may have the properties that we would like, this upper
bound cannot be made lower in general (although some systems can exploit it for some other UTMs).
The use of k as for equation 8 in theorem 1 suggests that we use this expression as a standalone expression:
logF (p, x) , log 2L(p) ·W (p, x) = L(p) + log(W (p, x)) (9)
As we are considering non-probabilistic programs and an identification problem (and not really an inversion
problem for any given partial recursive function), we do not need parameter x here.
logF (p) , log 2L(p) ·W (p, U(p)) = L(p) + log(W (p, U(p)))
According to the above process, it is easy to see that using the above procedure the first returned program
that outputs x will be one that minimises: Kt(x) , minp:U(p)=x logF (p).
Levin’s search assumes that there is a fast way of verifying policies. Now in the case of interactive
stochastic systems with a response function, the procedure cannot just verify that the policy is correct by
executing it once. Also, for each execution of the same program the number of steps can be different. How
can we adapt universal search to this situation?
Definition 2. Levin’s universal search for stochastic tasks and policies. Given a problem x and a universal
prefix-free Turing machine U , for which policies to x can be enumerated, we conduct several phases, starting
from phase 1. For phase i, we execute all possible programs p with L(p) ≤ i for at most si = 2i−L(p) steps
each. In these steps we include the steps required to execute p several times to consider that p is a policy for
x (within the alloted number of steps). As soon as the policy is deemed to be incorrect or the alloted number
of steps is exhausted, we try the next program. On the contrary, if the policy is verified the search is stopped.
While a policy is not found we continue until we complete the phase and then to a next stage i+ 1.
The number of verification steps now15 depend on stochastic executions and may vary (that is why we
denote them by W). And similarly, we get the equation for effort equal to eq. 9. In this case, we cannot get
rid of x in the definition, as p may be stochastic and W is understood as an expected value.
13In order to verify a string we need to compare bit by bit with x. Note that this is not going to be constant. In the worst
case, this takes c · L(x) steps, with c being the computational steps per bit verification of a program that goes bit by bit over
x. However, on average (assuming a 0.5 probability that a random program guesses each bit right), we have that the expected
value is
∑L(x)
i=1 i2
−i, which converges to 2, so we will have c · 2 steps on average. This is the reason why this verification part
is often ignored for identification problems.
14In this case, at the first moment that the string produced by p does not match x the verification is stopped.
15Actually, the number of verification steps was also an expected value, as depends on the differences between the reference
string and the output of the program.
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5.2 ‘PAC’ verification for stochastic tasks
Now we are going to adapt this to stochastic tasks. We again realise that for a stochastic system we can
never be 100% sure of a policy, because even after a million successes we can have a failure. The second
thing is that for stochastic systems it may be unreasonable to expect maximum or perfect result. In fact, by
using any statistical test about whether we have reached the maximum value, we cannot have any degree of
certainty (even the slimmest) of having this maximum value, as our average so far will never be above the
maximum value, which is necessary for statistical significance.
We could think about using one slack parameter. Given a series of n runs, we can calculate the average
r̂ and the standard deviation σ of the results. For instance, we can get the standard error by just SE = σ√
n
and set a limit on it. However, if we do this, we see that it depends on the magnitude. For instance, a
stochastic process alternating between 0 and 1 will have higher σ than if it alternates between 0.4 and 0.6,
just by scaling, even if the verification cost (of knowing whether it is above, e.g., 0.7, or not) looks the same.
Instead, we are going to consider two parameters. We want the search procedure to find a policy with
a confidence level δ, i.e., Pr(π solves µ) ≥ 1− δ. As mentioned above, if we consider the best possible result
(i.e., 1) to acknowledge that this is solved, then even with high values of δ this will never be achieved. So the
second thing is that if we consider a utility, response or result function R, we must set that the difference
with respect to the best policy is lower than a given error ϵ. If we denote the best possible average result
(for an infinite number of runs) as r∗ (note that r∗ can be lower than 1), we consider that a series of runs is
a sufficient verification for a probably approximate correct (PAC) policy π for µ when:
Pr(r∗ − r̂ ≤ ϵ) ≥ 1− δ (10)
with r̂ being the average of the results of the trials (runs) so far. As r∗ − r̂ ≤ ϵ is the same as r̂ ≥ r∗ − ϵ,
sometimes r∗ − ϵ will be referred to as the ‘threshold’ or ‘target’. For instance, if the achievable maximum
is 0.9 and ϵ = 0.15 then our threshold is 0.75.
Now we are ready to give an expression for the verification steps for a given problem µ and a policy
π. Namely, the number of verification steps W[ϵ,δ](π, µ) is defined as the expected value of the parameter s
returned by VerifyGen (Algorithm 1) for smax =∞.
Algorithm 1 Verification algorithm (generic)
1: function VerifyGen(π, µ, ϵ, δ, smax) ◃ smax is the number of allowed steps
2: j ← 1
3: s← 0
4: mπ ← ∅ ◃ The algorithm π can keep memory between trials. Initially empty.
5: repeat
6: ⟨rj , sj ,mπ⟩ ← Run(π,mπ, µ, smax − s) ◃ One trial with at most the smax − s remaining steps
7: ◃ Run returns response and used steps
8: s← s+ sj ◃ Accumulate steps
9: r ← r + rj ◃ Accumulate response
10: r̂ ← rj ◃ Average response
11: p← Pr(r∗ − r̂ ≤ ϵ) ◃ We calculate this probability in some way
12: if p ≥ 1− δ then return ⟨TRUE, s⟩ ◃ Stop because it is verified
13: else if p ≤ δ then return ⟨FALSE, s⟩ ◃ Stop because it is rejected
14: end if
15: j ← j + 1
16: until s ≥ smax
17: return ⟨FALSE, s⟩
18: end function
Note that we require r∗, which is defined as the highest expected response of any resource-bounded policy
(in LS). If this is not known, we can assume r∗ = 1, as in previous sections.
Algorithm 1, if using an appropriate estimation of the probability for stopping in each iteration, may
have a tendency of stopping prematurely because each iteration depends on the previous ones. Actually,
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especially in the beginning, this is vulnerable to spurious results and very bad estimations of the mean and
the variance of the response. This is basically the problem of (large-scale) multiple testing. One strong
correction is Bonferroni method, where the confidence per test is modified to: δ′ = δ/n, but as n are the
repetitions so far, it would be an incremental test.
Also, if used with definition 2, this problem is exacerbated. As we evaluate about 2i programs in each
phase (actually slightly less than this because it is a prefix code), we have that there can be cases that are
just accepted (the condition Pr(r∗ − r̂ ≤ ϵ) ≥ 1 − δ becomes true) by chance. Note that a rejection by
chance is not so problematic, as the same program will be evaluated in the following phase again.
Given all the considerations above, we realise that it is going to be very difficult to find the exact
statistical criteria to stop by acceptance and rejection. In what follows, we just propose an approximation to
the upper limit with the goal of recognising the difference in difficulty between finding an acceptable policy
for stochastic problems with high margin (r̂ + ϵ − r∗) and small standard deviation and those with tighter
margins and higher standard deviations.
First, we are going to assume that all runs take the same number of steps (a strong assumption, but let
us remind that this is an upper limit16), so the verification cost above could be approximated by
Ŵ[ϵ,δ](π, µ) , S(π, µ) · B[ϵ,δ](π, µ) (11)
i.e., the product of the expected number of steps times the expected number of verification bids (iterations
needed of the loop of Algorithm 1). With this, we focus on calculating the number of bids of the policy until
we verify it is a acceptable or not.
The number of bids can be estimated if we have the mean and the standard deviation of the response
for a series of runs. If the conditions of the central limit theorem held, we could consider that the results
of the bids would be normally distributed. In our case, the trials are not independent (neither are they
ergodic) if we consider that the algorithm has memory between the trials, but nevertheless we will make this
assumption, as, in general, we cannot make any further assumption about the distribution of the responses.
As a result we can use the confidence level given by the normal distribution. The confidence interval is given
by r̂ − |zδ/2|σ√
n
, r̂ +
|zδ/2|σ√
n
. Where zδ/2 is the standard normal quantile. For instance, for δ = 0.05, we have
|z0.025| = 1.96. We want this interval width w to be at most twice the margin over the threshold r∗ − ϵ− r̂.
So, w ≤ 2(r̂ + ϵ− r∗). As w = 2 |zδ/2|σ√
n
, we have: 2
|zδ/2|σ√
n
≤ 2(r̂ + ϵ− r∗). By isolating n we have:
n ≥ |zδ/2|
2σ2
(r̂ + ϵ− r∗)2 (12)
Note that the above formula is infinite when r∗ − ϵ = r̂, i.e., when we have that the policy reaches the
threshold exactly. We cannot verify it is above the threshold for any confidence level.
In order to apply the above expression we need the variance σ2. If we just have one run, this is undefined,
and for very few runs this is going to be poorly estimated. Many approaches to the estimation of a population
mean with unknown σ2 are based on a pilot or prior study (let us say we try 30 repetitions) and then derive
n using the normal distribution and then use this for a Student’s t distribution. Instead of this, we are going
to take an iterative approach where we update the mean and standard deviation after each repetition. The
problem, of course, happens with the first iterations. One approach we will take is to consider the maximum
standard deviation as a start (as a kind of Laplace correction). As we assume that the response R is between
0 and 1, we will consider17 two fabricated repetitions with responses 0 and 1. With this, our start sample
standard deviation will be high from the beginning and a minimum of iterations will always take place.
Algorithm 2 is a modification of Algorithm 1 where we use eq. 12.
Finally, we modify definition 2 by considering that when we find a verified policy we repeat the verification
again with some extra repetitions (for instance, n = 30, so that the used normal distribution is a more
sustainable assumption). Note that this extra verification will be performed just very occasionally, so this
will not significantly affect the number of steps taken by the modified Levin search. With all this, the
modified version is as follows:
16For instance, if ϵ = 0.5 and all bad policies have response 0.499999 and there is only one good policy with response 0.55,
we will require many repetitions to discard the bad policies, until we find and verify the good policy.
17Other options exist, such as deriving some initial values depending on the threshold.
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Algorithm 2 Verification algorithm (normality)
1: function VerifyNorm(π, µ,ϵ, δ, smax) ◃ smax is the number of allowed steps
2: j ← 3 ◃ We consider two first response with high variance
3: r ← 0 + 1 ◃ One with value 0 and the other with value 1
4: s← 0
5: mπ ← ∅ ◃ The algorithm π can keep memory between trials. Initially empty.
6: repeat
7: ⟨rj , sj ,mπ⟩ ← Run(π,mπ, µ, smax − s) ◃ One trial with at most
8: ◃ the smax − s remaining steps Run returns response and used steps
9: s← s+ sj ◃ Accumulate steps
10: r ← r + rj ◃ Accumulate response
11: r̂ ← rj ◃ Average response
12: σ̂2 ← Var[r1 . . . rj ] ◃ Variance estimation
13: n0 ← |zδ/2|
2σ̂2
(r̂+ϵ−r∗)2
14: if j ≥ n0 then
15: if r̂ > r∗ − ϵ then return ⟨TRUE, s⟩ ◃ Stop because it is verified
16: else return ⟨FALSE, s⟩ ◃ Stop because it is rejected
17: end if
18: end if
19: j ← j + 1
20: until s ≥ smax
21: return ⟨FALSE, s⟩
22: end function
Definition 3. Levin’s universal search for stochastic tasks and policies with given tolerance ϵ, confidence
level 1 − δ, and maximum response reference r∗. Given a task µ for which policies can be enumerated. We
conduct several phases, starting from phase 1. For phase i, we execute all possible policies π with L(π) ≤ i
for si = 2
i−L(π) steps each. We call function VerifyNorm(π, µ, ϵ, δ, smax) in Algorithm 2 with smax = si.
While an acceptable policy is not found we continue until we complete the phase and then to a next stage i+1.
If an acceptable policy is found, some extra trials are performed before stopping the search for confirmation.
Theorem 2. For every µ and ϵ, δ > 0, if a maximum r∗ exists achievable by a computable policy18 and it is
given, then definition 3 conducts a finite search.
Proof. As r∗ is defined as the highest expected response for a resource-bounded policy π∗ (in L) and it exists,
then there is a number of phases where π∗ has already been found and there are enough steps such that r̂
is becoming as closer to r∗ as needed such that r̂ + ϵ− r∗ is positive and sufficiently close to ϵ such that is
verified Pr(r∗ − r̂ ≤ ϵ) ≥ 1− δ. Note that as results are bounded between 0 and 1 the highest variability is
σ2 = 1/4, so we have that n ∼ |zδ/2|
2σ2
(ϵ)2 is bounded.
Note that if instead of r∗ we give a higher value that, subtracted the error tolerance, cannot be attained,
then the search is not bounded. Also note that in any case there can be a very simple policy equal to r∗ − ϵ
and will never be found.
Definition 3 is conceived to find the optimal policy, and it is not parametrised to calculate how long the
search is to discard non-optimal policies. Actually, what we do is to use the approximation (i.e., equation
11) into another approximation for any possible π, assuming that π were the best policy.
In the end, what we want is to have a term that accounts for the variability of computational steps given
by the variance of the response and its proximity to the threshold, as both things make verification more
difficult. This is finally calculated as:
B[ϵ,δ](π, µ) ,
|zδ/2|2Var[R(π, µ)]
(R(π, µ) + ϵ− r∗)2 (13)
18It could not exist if there is a never-ending series of programs requiring, e.g., more time to get a slightly better policy. It
exists if there is a limit of steps (not time) with the interaction with the environment.
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For both Var[R(π, µ)] and R(π, µ) we consider that we include two extra responses as a start, as done in
Algorithm 2.
And now the effort (eq. 9) is rewritten as:
logF[ϵ,δ](π, µ) , log(2L(π) · Ŵ[ϵ,δ](π, µ)) = L(π) + log Ŵ[ϵ,δ](π, µ) (14)
For clarity, we can expand what F is by using the definition Ŵ from eq. 11 and taking the bids from eq. 13
as:
logF[ϵ,δ](π, µ) = L(π) + log S(π, µ) · B[ϵ,δ](π, µ) = L(π) + log S(π, µ) + logB[ϵ,δ](π, µ) (15)
It is a good question to determine whether S and B have comparable magnitudes. If the policies take
thousands of steps and the number of repetitions is in the order of dozens or hundreds, then the variability
of the responses will not be very important, and the difficulty will be dominated by L and S. However, this
depends on the task; there are of course cases for which B can be very relevant.
From here, we can finally define a measure of difficulty that accounts for all the issues that affect the
search of the policy for a stochastic task:
~[ϵ,δ](µ) , minπ logF[ϵ,δ](π, µ) (16)
It is important to compare this definition with those in section 3.2 and Table 1. Algorithm 2 considers that
the algorithm has memory between tasks, so we are really extending Kt[ϵ, 7→ν](µ) in section 3.2 —but it can
be modified easily without memory. The good thing is that now we do not need to specify ν any more, as the
number of trials is given by Levin’s search itself. This takes some of the (best) cases from the two columns
of Table 1 with Kt.
5.3 Interpretation and use
Does the approximation in equations 15 and 16 work properly? In order to get more insight about how it
works we are going to see some figurative examples and see the values that would result, in order to see the
effect of B in the new formula of difficulty. This is shown in Table 4 (all cases consider r∗ = 1). As we see
from the results, there are cases where B can be large and have effect on log(F).
While the use of B includes an extra complication to the notion of difficulty, it does not add any significant
additional cost in its computation, as for S we need to execute the optimal policy many times. Nonetheless,
the most difficult part of the estimation of difficulty is finding the optimal policy π∗.
The previous sections can be analysed in terms of whether they lead to bounded difficulty functions. It
seems that for the target case (section 5.2) we have that if r∗ = 1, the difficulty function is unbounded, but
otherwise it can be bounded.
The number of repetitions is related to effort. We have argued that this is an upper approximation, but
it can be much lower in many occasions. For instance, if an environment gives rewards 0 and 0.6 uniformly
randomly independently of the action, so the expected response is 0.3, a threshold on 0.29999999 will lead to
a high W but there is nothing to choose, as all policies behave the same, and whatever the agent does would
be the same. All other policies get the same result, so there is no need for effort for discarding hypotheses, or
dangers in guessing a wrong policy, etc. This is related to unquestionability, as whether there are competing
programs of similar complexity is relevant, as in [29, 15]. However, a Levin search (or a real agent) does not
have this information, so all the verification effort has to be done anyway.
6 Conclusions
As we have mentioned during this paper, the notion of task is common in AI evaluation, in cognition and
also in human evaluation. However, a general formalisation, their arrangement and, most especially, their
difficulty has not been addressed with earnest determination. Of course, with this resolution of being general,
we have left some other more comfortable approaches, such as MDP and other formalisations in AI. Our
main goal was difficulty, as we have seen that this is central to many of the other questions. Difficulty is seen
as computational steps of a Levin search, but this search has to be modified to cover stochastic behaviours.
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responses 1− ϵ 1− δ L(π∗) S(π∗, µ) R σ B with σ̂ B with σ log(F) with σ̂
anything anything 1 - - ∞ ∞
1 1 anything 1 0 49 NaN
1 0.99 0.95 1 0 197 0
0* 0.01 0.95 0 0 197 0
1 0.3 0.95 1 0 2 0
0.3 0.3 0.95 0.3 0 ∞ 0
{0.002, 0.018} 0.01 0.95 0.019 0.008 ∞ ∞
{0.002, 0.018} 0.009 0.95 0.019 0.008 28 62
1 one in 100 0.009 0.95 0.01 0.0995 7600 9507
N(0.01,0.001) 0.009 0.95 0.01 0.001 26 9
0.01 0.009 0.95 0.01 0 649 0
{0, 1} 0.45 0.95 0.5 0.5 98 97
0.5 0.45 0.95 0.5 0 14 0
0.55 0.5 0.95 0.55 0 16 0
0.45* 0.5 0.95 0.45 0 16 0
0.5 0.3 0.95 0.5 0 4 0
0.5 0.3 0.9 0.5 0 3 0
0.5 0.3 0.99 0.5 0 5 0
1 0.5 0.95 10 200 1 0 4 0 10 + log(800) = 19.6
0.51 0.5 0.95 5 100 0.51 0 93 0 5 + log(9300) = 18.2
0.51 0.5 0.95 7 20 0.51 0 93 0 7 + log(1860) = 17.0
0.51 0.5 0.95 10 200 0.51 0 93 0 10 + log(18600) = 24.2
anything 0 anything - - - - 0 0
Table 4: Examples of stochastic tasks. We are assuming r∗ = 1 (see second column). We figure out an
optimal policy π∗ and see what value for F would result (note that we are not doing an actual Levin search
here). All estimations are using smoothing by the inclusion of a result 0 and 1 at the beginning of the
results vector, as in Algorithm 2. We use 1, 000 trials to calculate the true expected response and the true
variance. R and σ are shown without the smoothing. The expected number of bids (B with σ̂) is calculated
incrementally until the number of repetitions needed to calculate a value of n (the repetitions) is lower than
the current iteration, as if the variance were approximated incrementally. The same calculation with the
perfect value of σ is represented in the next column: (B with σ). Note that W is approximated here as
a product of expected values, as it is actually the expected value of an algorithm using many runs. The
asterisks in the first column represent that these are cases played with policies that are rejected (just for
comparison).
26
Nonetheless, we have been able to find an expression in terms of the best policy for the task. These ideas
are an evolution and continuation of early notions of task and difficulty in [25] and [21] respectively.
There have been some early approaches where the role of Kt has been explored for different kinds of
optimisation or inference problems [16, 26, 30, 18, 17]. The disposition and arrangement of tasks was
discussed in [19], as well as the notion of task or agent breadth [46, 14, 49], and the distinction between
specific and general [31]. The notions introduced in this paper, and the expression for difficulty can be useful
to reunderstand some of the recent contributions in the evaluation of intelligence [41, 32, 22, 20, 37, 24, 11,
27, 28, 35, 36, 39, 9, 42, 10, 23, 38].
The relevance of verification in difficulty has usually been associated with deduction. However, some
works have incorporated it as well in other inference problems, such as induction and optimisation, using
Levin’s Kt [17, 47, 2].
We can briefly mention some issues that we have not fully developed here. First, we limit difficulty
to the complexity of the best policy. However, the notion would be more robust if we considered more
policies and their aggregation using a (universal) distribution. This is in principle possible, but would make
the expression more convoluted and the notions of composition and decomposition trickier to analyse. A
second issue is that in the second part of the paper we have not discussed the value of ν as in Kt[ϵ, 7→ν](µ) in
section 3.2, because it is said to be given by the Levin’s search. However, this could be further investigated.
Many other things could be explored, especially around the notions of composition and decomposition, task
instance and agent response curves. Also, while our use of ‘PAC’ is just superficially related to PAC learning,
we may have a closer look as this, in particular in the context of PAC reinforcement learning [55].
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